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 No matter how one evaluates the product of its work, the Convention on the Future of 
Europe has marked a turning point in the history of European integration. Up until then, 
Member States’ governments played an essential role in institutional reform because it was 
carried out through treaty changes. The diplomatic conferences mandated to organize these 
reforms brought together governmental delegates. Since the treaties could only be modified 
with the agreement of all of the states, each of them enjoyed a veto power.  This very classic 
system reflected the original nature of the European Communities, then of the European 
Union: an international organization, admittedly atypical, whose powers have continually 
increased (in number and scope) over the years, but in which Member States had no intention 
of giving up their most fundamental power – i.e. the power to determine who does what, their 
‘pouvoir constituant’, the Kompetenz Kompetenz. Therefore, any treaty modifications 
required negotiation between Member State governments. 
 The December 2001 Laeken Declaration, the Convention’s birth certificate, was 
inspired by a desire to break with this purely intergovernmental logic (Laeken Declaration, 
2001).  For the first time, the governments, acknowledging the quasi-failure of Nice, agreed 
to share part of their power to define the fundamental rules with other actors: they entrusted 
an enlarged assembly with the task of proposing new reforms.  Delegates from parliamentary 
assemblies (national and European) along with Commission representatives were asked to 
join the governmental delegates, who even became a minority within the Convention.  Plans 
were also made for a structured dialogue with civil society.  As for the rules of the game, the 
Declaration provided that the Convention would decide by ‘consensus’, not by unanimity. 
But, the Declaration did not specify how to assess if ‘consensus’ had been reached, 
stating only that the candidate countries could not block decision-making.  It was equally 
vague as to the desired outcome(s) of the exercise.  Although it raised a long series of 
questions, the Declaration left open the way in which the Convention was to address them, 
alluding only to ‘a final document which may comprise either different options, indicating the 
degree of support which they received or recommendations if consensus is achieved’. Rather, 
the possibility of a constitution was contemplated as a long-term prospect.  This idea gained 
credit as the President of the Convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, spoke of a 
‘Constitutional Treaty’ at the inaugural session and later of a ‘Constitution’ (Giscard 
d’Estaing, 2002). 
 The Declaration was very precise on one point: whatever the result of its work, the 
Convention was to be followed by an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).  It is easy to 
understand why: in order to calm the fears of some governments about this more open 
process, they were given the right to scrutinize the assembly’s work (Magnette and 
Nicolaïdis, 2004).  As will be seen, this safeguard played an important role especially at the 
end of the Convention. 
Regardless of these ambiguities, the Convention was immediately seen as an 
innovation, half way between two alternative formulas.  While its diversity and the publicity 
surrounding its work broke with the classical formula of Intergovernmental Conferences, its 
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members – the majority elected officials – had not been elected in order to participate in the 
elaboration of a new fundamental pact: it was not a constituent assembly.  
This hybrid formula is the source of numerous questions. To what extent did it 
produce results noticeably different from those of reforms negotiated by Intergovernmental 
Conferences? What were the strategies pursued by the various actors participating in the 
work of the Convention?  Which elements most strongly influenced the eventual outcome?  
Our study focuses primarily on the process of elaborating the draft constitution rather than on 
the final document itself, though the outcome inevitably sheds light on the debates that 
preceded it. Given our interest in the Convention, the period we survey ends with the 
adoption of the draft Constitution in June-July 2003. We do not intend to discuss the work of 
the ensuing IGC, but will sometimes refer to its final product in order to assess the resources 
held by national governments. 
 This article is divided into three parts. The first presents the different actors who 
participated in the Convention and the cleavages that existed within the assembly. The second 
part addresses the impact of these cleavages and the logics that shaped the final compromise.  
In the third part, we will attempt to analyze the respective importance of these various 
decision-making modes and the variables that determined their relative influence.  Going 
beyond the classical opposition between deliberation and negotiation often used to describe 
the work of the Convention, we will argue that the choices made on the composition and 
functioning of the Convention had a strong influence on its work, and therefore, on the 
substance of the draft constitution.   
 
 
I. The Convention Actors, Organization, and Cleavages  
 
 During the Laeken European Council, the Heads of State and Government took up the 
idea of a heterogeneous assembly comprising members not only from the various Member 
States, but also from different institutions. This Convention method had been used in 2000 to 
draw up a European Charter of Human Rights and it was largely viewed as a success 
(Deloche-Gaudez, 2001). In Laeken, the ‘creators’1 of the European Convention even 
increased the size and heterogeneity of the assembly by inviting representatives from the 
candidate countries. 
 
1. A Large and Heterogeneous Assembly  
 
In hindsight, the hopes raised by the European Convention may astonish, as it was a 
rather large body whose numerous members could face difficulties agreeing on common 
decisions.  
The plenary sessions for the European Convention included up to 207 members, 
excluding observers.2  The distinction made in the Laeken Declaration between full members 
and alternates could have reduced the Convention to 100 or so members.  President Giscard 
d’Estaing, in particular, tried to play down the alternates’ role, in order to both limit the size 
of the assembly and favor the emergence of a true ‘spirit of the Convention’ (‘esprit de la 
Convention’).  The rules of procedure3 provided that alternates could only take part in the 
                                                 
1 We use this term in the same fashion as Jon Elster (Elster, 1994). 
2 The Laeken Declaration provided that three representatives from the Economic and Social Committee, three 
representatives of the European social partners, six representatives from the Committee of the Regions and the 
European Ombudsman would be invited as observers. 
3 In response to critics, the ‘Draft Rules of Procedure’ (CONV 3/02)  was amended by the Presidium and  re-
baptized ‘Note on Working Methods’ (CONV 9/02). The provision stipulating that ‘an alternate may take the 
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discussions in a member’s absence. Nonetheless, many elements mitigated this distinction. 
First of all, this provision was not always respected. More importantly, like full members, 
alternates could submit written contributions to the Presidium and participate in working 
groups. They could also ‘propose’ amendments to the various draft articles. Their support 
was even  sought by full members as they could help produce a “mass effect” against the 
Presidium4.  
 Not only was the Convention larger than an Intergovernmental Conference, but it was 
also much more heterogeneous. Its members were drawn from four different kinds of 
institutions (national governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament and the 
European Commission). Each category – the ‘institutional components’ in the language of the 
Convention – appeared in turn fairly heterogeneous. 
 The national governments, the only actors present in Intergovernmental Conferences, 
were a minority in the Convention with only 15 members.  Even if one includes the 
representatives from the 13 candidate countries who participated in the Convention 
(including Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), they barely represented a quarter of the 
Convention members. The governments’ representatives also formed a very heterogeneous 
component.  The Laeken Declaration made a distinction between Member State and 
candidate country representatives. According to the Declaration, the latter were not  ‘able to 
prevent any consensus which may emerge among the Member States’.5  Nonetheless, two 
factors played down the impact of this distinction. On the one hand, the uncertainties 
surrounding the concept of consensus limited the practical consequences of this arrangement, 
which was in any case difficult to apply. On the other hand, by finalizing in December 2002 
the accession negotiations with 10 candidate countries and providing that they ‘will 
participate fully in the next Intergovernmental Conference’, the Copenhagen European 
Council implicitly enhanced their status within the Convention. 
Although the differences in status progressively lessened, the representatives of 
national governments never presented a united front on fundamental issues, notably as 
regards the division of powers among the European institutions. The national government 
component part was crisscrossed by numerous fault lines (large versus small or midsize 
states; Member States versus candidate countries; founding states versus non-founders). For 
instance, with regards to the composition of the Commission, the ‘one Commissioner per 
Member State’ option was supported by smaller Member States and candidate countries, with 
the exception of the founding Benelux countries, but including Poland. The new voting rules 
put forward by the Presidium6 even contributed to distinguishing a new category of Member 
States, the ‘midsize Member States’, namely Spain and Poland. The latter fiercely opposed 
the new system, which reduced their weight in the Council of Ministers. 
The members of the national parliaments formed a majority with two representatives 
per country, i.e. 53 % of all the members of the Convention.  But, the very size of the group, 
along with other factors such as the absence of a common secretariat, made the elaboration 
and defense of common positions more difficult.  Even on the issue of reinforcing the role of 
national parliaments within the European Union, which was the subject of a working group 
within the Convention, the national delegates were unable to find a common position.  Some 
recommended better control over governments inside of each country, while others pushed 
for the creation of a new body – the Congress – bringing together members of national and 
European Parliaments.  These differences seemed to owe more to differing institutional 
                                                                                                                                                        
floor in a meeting of the Convention when the member whom he replaces will be absent for a full day’ 
remained. 
4 About the Presidium, see below. 
5 The same rule applied to national parliamentarians. 
6 See below 
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contexts than to precise instructions from their national governments.  The French delegates, 
for instance, were quite eager to compensate for the traditionally weak position of the 
Parliament in their political system.  
 Although less numerous – they comprised only 15 % of the Convention members- the 
European Parliament delegates had more influence.  As with the first Convention (Deloche-
Gaudez, 2001), they had the “home advantage” (i.e. the Convention met in the rooms of 
European Parliament). They also benefited from being accustomed to dealing with European 
issues and expressing themselves in a transnational assembly.  This enabled them to take a 
more active part in the Convention deliberations than their numbers would lead one to 
believe. For instance, during the debate on complementary competencies in November 2002, 
MEPs represented about 25% of all speakers. Moreover, the fact that they could easily meet 
outside the plenary sessions and that the European Parliament adopted resolutions on the 
issues discussed in the Convention allowed them to efficiently promote positions supported 
by a majority of them.  Unsurprisingly, this was particularly true when it came to defending 
the powers of the European Parliament within the Union, but they were also able to present a 
fairly united front on other issues.  For example, MEPs managed to sideline the conclusions 
of the ‘Complementary Competencies’ working group, forbidding all European legislation in 
areas in which the EU only enjoys limited powers (Lamassoure, 2004).  Similarly, MEPs 
successfully opposed the idea of a new ‘Congress’, which they saw as a potential rival. 
Finally, to clarify the division of competencies, the Convention took up the general 
framework suggested in a report issued by the EP Committee on Constitutional Affairs and a 
resolution adopted by the European Parliament in May 2002.7   
 On paper MPs and MEPs formed an enormous group, representing 86 % of the 
Convention members. But, only toward the end of the Convention, in the hope of countering 
the demands of the national governments, did they manage to put forward joint proposals 
(Norman, 2003: 292). Though some of these, like the idea of referenda enabling citizens to 
ask the Commission to table a legislative proposal,8 eventually found their way into the draft 
Constitution, it cannot be said that this “grand coalition” exerted a decisive influence 
(Dauvergne, 2004). 
 Numbers did not play in the European Commission’s favor, as only two members 
represented it. Several factors nevertheless allowed the two Commissioners to compensate for 
this numeric inferiority: the absence of clear contrasts between their positions; their 
willingness to participate in working groups; their active contribution to plenary sessions; 
and, last but not least, their participation in the Presidium.  Both were quite familiar with the 
issues of debate. Portuguese Commissioner Antonio Vitorino was widely regarded by 
Convention members as one of the best specialists on Justice and Home Affairs, as well as, 
on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, their task was made more complex by the 
public disclosure of a draft constitution (the “Penelope” project), written by a small group of 
Commission experts at the request of President Prodi, without their direct involvement.9  
 
                                                 
7 Report on the division of competencies between the European Union and the Member States, 24 April 2004, 
A5-0133/2002, 
http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PROG=REPORT&L=EN&SORT_ORDER=D&LEG_ID=5&COM_I
D=608&LEVEL=2&SAME_LEVEL=1&SV=20&NAV=X; 
Resolution adopted by the European Parliament, Division of competencies between the EU and the Member 
States,16 May 2002, 
http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2002-
0247+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=X 
8 Article I-46 of the Convention’s draft constitution 
9 On the “Penelope” project, see Mattera, 2003; on Giscard’s reactions to the Penelope project, see Deloche-
Gaudez, 2003a. 
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2. The Organizational Wheels   
 
The Convention was not only divided along ‘institutional’ lines. The Laeken 
Declaration assigned a few Convention members a steering role, which proved to be of great 
importance.  
First in line was naturally the former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, 
appointed by the Laeken European Council to preside over the assembly, instead of being 
elected by the Convention10. His prerogatives enabled him to influence what went into and 
came out of the Convention. At the beginning of the decision-making process, he kept an eye 
on every document transmitted to the Convention: he read the drafts prepared by the 
Secretariat before they were transmitted to the Presidium then to the Convention; he was even 
able to draft some articles himself, in particular those pertaining to the institutions. His 
chairmanship gave him ample opportunity to shape the consensus within the assembly. At the 
end of each plenary meeting of the Convention (and of the Presidium), he took the floor to 
summarize ‘the lessons learned from the debate’. He rapidly came to be known for his 
creative interpretations of the assembly’s views, notably when he tried to ignore the 
opposition raised by the idea of a new Congress (Deloche-Gaudez, 2003a; Duhamel, 2003, 
71-2).  
 The Laeken European Council flanked him with two former Prime Ministers who 
served as Vice-Presidents: Italy’s Giuliano Amato and Belgium’s Jean-Luc Dehaene.  The 
three of them formed the Convention’s Presidency. Each Vice-President contributed to 
shaping the work of the Convention in the working groups he chaired.  Their influence was 
noteworthy on many issues. Amato was instrumental in the process of ‘simplification’, 
rallying support for a single legal personality, the adoption of a single text to replace existing 
treaties and the simplification of the Union’s instruments. Dehaene pushed for a ‘double-
hatted’ Foreign Affairs Minister combining the conduct of foreign policy with responsibility 
within the Commission for external relations. All of these proposals were subsequently 
endorsed by the Convention. 
 A committee – the Presidium – was established to organize the work of the 
Convention and submit written texts to the assembly.  This body comprised the President, the 
two Vice-Presidents and representatives from each institutional component.11 At the request 
of the candidate countries, a ‘thirteenth man’, the Slovenian A. Peterlé, was added to 
represent them.  The members of the Presidium had the opportunity to examine all working 
documents issued by the Secretariat and to discuss them before they were transmitted to the 
Convention members. Its members, therefore, had the privilege of examining draft articles 
before other members of the Convention.  Although it has been argued that their influence 
was sometimes limited due to lack of time and expertise, as well as to internal divisions 
(Stuart, 2003), the Presidium turned out to be one of the key fora in discussions over the EU 
institutions12.  
Finally, mention should also be made of another major actor, barely referred to in the 
Laeken Declaration: the Secretariat of the Convention.  That structure included officials 
seconded from national and EU institutions under the direction of Sir John Kerr, former  
Permanent Under Secretary of State of the Foreign Office and former Permanent 
                                                 
10 For the reasons behind this choice, see Deloche-Gaudez, 2003; Magnette and Nicolaidis, 2004. 
11 There were representatives of national governments which held the Presidency of the Union during the Convention : 
Henning Christophersen, Ana Palacio (replaced in March 2003 by Alfonso Dastis) and Giorgos Katiforis (replaced in 
February 2003 by Giorgos Papandreou); the two national parliament representatives were John Bruton and Gisela Stuart; the 
two European Parliament representatives : Inigo Mendez de Vigo et Klaus Hänsch; the two Commission representatives 
Michel Barnier et Antonio Vitorino. 
 
12 See below, section 2 
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Representative of the United Kingdom in Brussels.  It drafted the first versions of virtually all 
the documents discussed in the Presidium, then in the Convention, including the successive 
drafts of the constitutional text. The Secretariat enjoyed a number of organizational assets. 
Unlike most members of the Convention who had other functions, its officials worked full-
time for the assembly. Most of their work took place behind closed doors and their combined 
expertise covered most, if not all, aspects of relevance for the Convention’s work. Their 
diversity, which reflected that of the Convention, even enabled them to test a number of ideas 
that could be sharpened before being submitted to the assembly. All of these elements explain 
how it was able to exert a strong influence during the 18 months of the Convention (Deloche-
Gaudez, 2004). 
 
3. Overlapping Cleavages 
 
 The Convention appeared to be fraught with overlapping divisions.  Some were 
explicitly foreseen in the Laeken Declaration and new cleavages emerged during the course 
of its work.  Three of them seem to have left their mark on the work of the Assembly. 
 Following the Laeken Declaration, the Convention was organized into groups 
bringing together Conventioneers according to their different ‘institutional’ origins. This 
naturally shaped institutional cleavages. The component parts of the Convention met before 
every plenary session in order to try to elaborate common positions. When they were 
successful, these positions generally reflected common institutional interests: the national 
parliaments supported control over the principle of subsidiarity and Community legislation, 
the European Parliament pushed to enhance the co-decision procedure and fought against the 
establishment of a ‘Congress’ bringing together MEPs and representatives of national 
parliaments. At the end of the Convention, the members of the Presidency opened a dialogue 
with the different component parts in order to explore the possibilities for consensus. At that 
moment, the institutional cleavages appeared to be quite strong. The national governments’ 
representatives threatened not to approve the final draft (each for different reasons), while 
national and European parliamentary delegates presented common demands in the hopes of 
influencing the Presidium’s final decisions.  
Although the way in which the Convention was organized tended to minimize 
national cleavages, the Convention members’ national origins did matter. A sharp 
antagonism between large and small states emerged on institutional issues, although founding 
members’ attempts to play a mediating role, e.g. regarding the composition of the 
Commission, sometimes mitigated it. Furthermore, government representatives often 
succeeded in rallying support from countrymen and women around key positions deemed to 
be of crucial importance.  For example, the French government’s position in favor of 
maintaining the ‘exception culturelle’ (i.e. the possibility to continue to unanimously decide 
on culture-related agreements, as an exception to the majority voting rule to be applied to all 
trade agreements) was also defended by the representatives from the French Parliament.   
French members of the European Parliament ended up supporting this position, although 
allegedly for reasons based on ‘pragmatism’ or ‘legal expertise’13.  Nevertheless, even on 
such a highly salient issue, national logic was not the only one at work. When cornered by 
                                                 
13 French MEPAlain Lamassoure called for the application of the principle of the Union not having external 
competency over matters in which it does not have internal competence. In other words, since cultural issues 
were decided on by unanimity, the same should apply to the conclusion of external agreements in that area; see 
the verbatim report of the plenary session, 9 July 2004, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/textes/verbatim_030709.htm 
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President Giscard d’Estaing during a plenary session, French Commissioner Michel Barnier 
defended the views of the Commission, contrary to his own country’s demands.14 
 Ideological cleavages were also present during the debates.  The two major dividing 
lines structuring the European political scene co-existed within the Convention.  There was a 
clear antagonism between the pro-Europeans and the Euro-skeptics, despite the latter’s under-
representation, which in the end led them to present their dissident opinion as an ‘alternative 
report’.15  Partisan cleavages also played their part.  Convention members belonging to like-
minded political parties met before every plenary session just like the institutional component 
parts.  Within this framework, they elaborated various written drafts: the European Socialist 
Party (ESP) offered ‘Priorities for Europe’, whereas the European People’s Party (EPP) went 
so far as to prepare their own draft constitution.  During the third phase of the Convention, 
when the Conventioneers tried to propose joint amendments, they often did so on the basis of 
political affinities, particularly among members of the European Parliament. Some issues 
were clearly marked by a left-right cleavage. Left-wing conventioneers long fought to 
convince a reluctant President to set up a working group on social issues. When it came to 
discussing the objectives of the Union, right-wing Convention members tried to replace the 
‘full employment’ objective with the idea of a ‘high level of employment’. However, it 
proves difficult to identify amendments that were exclusively proposed by left or right wing 
members of the Convention.  As often happens at the European level, partisan considerations 
were frequently blurred due to the polarization between supporters and adversaries of greater 
integration (Magnette, 2004) or by national considerations. For instance, the amendment 
proposing to introduce the objective of a ‘social market economy’ in the draft constitution 
was tabled by German MEP Elmar Brok, who coordinated the EPP group in the Convention 
and received support from left wing Conventioneers.  
 While the multiplicity of cleavages increased in parallel with the debates’ complexity, 
it nonetheless contributed to the relative fluidity of the work of the Convention by softening 
the divisions. Given their multiple allegiances (country, party, and institutions), Convention 
members could ‘change hats’ in support of a position and make it more ‘consensual’, thus, 
facilitating the emergence of a decision-making mode that was more flexible than a standard 
negotiation. 
 
II. Decision-Making Dynamics  
 The latter remark brings us to the decision-making process. As indicated in the 
introduction, the creation of the Convention was largely motivated by a desire to go beyond 
the negotiations which characterized Intergovernmental Conferences and to allow the 
development of a deliberative logic. However, to understand the way in which consensus was 
eventually achieved, additional logics need to be considered.  
 
1. Negotiation and the Role of Interests 
 
 Negotiation is the exchange of concessions between actors defending their interests.  
Of all the methods underlying the work of the Convention, this is the easiest to discern, as it 
usually involves clearly identifiable actors (government representatives) supporting relatively 
well-known positions. Despite expectations that the Convention would distance itself from 
the intergovernmental model, negotiations did occur for two related reasons. First, the 
Convention was to be followed by an Intergovernmental Conference in which each national 
government would regain its right of veto. As well, Convention members in general, and their 
                                                 
14 See the verbatim report of the plenary session, 9 July 2003, 
http ://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/textes/verbatim_030709.htm. 
15 See document CONV 851/03.  
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President in particular, were willing to prevent the document from being ‘unwoven’ during 
the Intergovernmental Conference. National governments were therefore in a position to 
impose some of their views by threatening to reject a text that would not meet their demands 
in the future IGC. Their influence was quite strong in issues on which they had strong 
preferences, particularly at the end of the Convention. To mention but a few examples, the 
‘exception culturelle’, so dear to the French government’s heart, was maintained. The word 
‘federal’ was withdrawn at the British government’s request and several national 
governments, including Germany, successfully opposed the extension of majority voting in 
the social field (on the last example, see Berès, 2003: 56; Dauvergne, 2003: 258). 
Governments also gave ample evidence of a strong ‘esprit de corps’, seeking in priority 
convergence amongst themselves. The joint proposal, tabled in January 2002 by the French 
and German governments, is of course, emblematic in this respect.  
On this basis, one could be tempted to conclude that even within the Convention, the 
traditional logic of intergovernmental negotiation remained intact: national interests shaped 
the eventual outcome, interstate bargains proved decisive on major issues, and decisions 
tended to reflect the preferences of the larger states (Moravcsik, 2004).  Nonetheless, several 
elements do not fit in with this view. 
First, as regards institutional issues, it is easy to overestimate the influence of the 
Franco-German axis.  Reflecting their very different national political cultures, the two 
governments’ starting positions were fairly far apart.  Germany favored a federal-type 
solution and  advocated a strengthening of both the Commission and the European 
Parliament, whereas France remained faithful to its traditional intergovernmentalism 
(Interviews at the Quai d’Orsay, February 2003).  Eager to present a common position, the 
two heads of the executive finally agreed on a text – which was made public during the 
fortieth anniversary celebration of the Elysée Treaty. The Franco-German document (Fischer, 
de Villepin, 2003) included both countries’ favorite solution with little concern for coherence.  
It called for a permanent president of the European Council (to satisfy the intergovernmental 
camp) and for the Parliament to elect the president of the Commission (an important goal of 
the federalists).  No wonder then, that this compromise “inspired” the final agreement, for it 
incorporated antagonistic solutions. Indeed, this is one of the strengths of past Franco-
German proposals: they often strike a balance between distinctly opposite preferences, the 
other governments can usually get something out of it as well.  But, to speak of leadership in 
this case would be excessive.16  As a matter of fact, in the final text of the Constitution, the 
European Council President is more a ‘chairperson’ than the leader Paris envisioned and 
contrary to Berlin’s wishes the President of the Commission is not directly elected by the 
European Parliament.  
Recognizing that some interstate bargaining took place during the Convention does 
not mean agreeing with traditional “realist” analyses on the formation of national preferences. 
These analyses tend to underline the importance of interest assessments: each government 
advocates the solution it feels is most consonant with its national interest (Moravcsik, 1998).  
It is difficult to deny the importance of this factor, illustrated by Spain and Poland’s rejection 
of the Constitution in order to preserve their weighted votes within the Council. Nonetheless, 
one should also not overlook the value of ideas in the process of institutional reform 
(Christiansen, Falkner and Jorgensen, 2002). 
As was already mentioned, a state’s traditional position is often inspired, at least in 
part, by its political culture. Whereas the French and British visions of the common good 
emphasize the need for leadership, the Germans generally favor a federal system similar to 
                                                 
16 Indeed, at the very moment when the institutional debate heated up in the Convention, the Iraqi crisis 
demonstrated that Franco-German agreement is not enough to gain the support of their peers, if their positions 
did not reflect the entire range of national governments’ opinions. 
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their own and the Swedes favor the principle of transparency, a value enshrined in their 
constitution. 
Obviously, it can be difficult to establish a clear causal link between ideas and the 
positions upheld by a government, since ideas and interests can coincide.  Germany’s defense 
of an increased role for the Parliament could as easily be a means to promote its own 
interests, since it has the greatest number of delegates.  At the same time, there is no shortage 
of counter-examples to make the ‘ideational’ argument plausible.  The federal government’s 
pro-parliament attitude does not date back to the Treaties of Maastricht and Nice, which 
improved Germany’s parliamentary representation; rather, it corresponds to a traditional 
position held by German diplomats since at least the early 1980s.  In contrast, a purely 
interest-based logic would see larger states pleading in the Parliament’s favor – where they 
are better represented than in the Council – with resistance from the smaller states, 
conforming to a cleavage common to all federal systems.  Yet, the United Kingdom and 
France are not among the Parliament’s allies, whereas the small Benelux countries are. In a 
nutshell, the position of a government can be influenced by ‘world visions’, which do not 
necessarily correspond to their interests.  
 
2. Deliberation and the Weight of Ideas 
 
 Negotiation is traditionally opposed to deliberation, a process through which actors 
modify their preferences in the light of exchanged arguments. Ideational factors play a key 
role in this process, as they often do when collective decisions are about issues of aggregate 
welfare, rather than about redistributing resources (Majone, 2000?). By bringing together 
heterogeneous actors, formally deprived of any veto power, within an assembly where they 
could confront their views, supporters of the Convention method hoped to create a space for 
deliberation. There were clear signs of such a dynamic in the early phases of the 
Convention, largely devoted to an exchange of views on the ambitions of the enlarged EU 
(Magnette 2003). In some instances, deliberation appeared to lead to changes even in the 
drafting phase. During an informal session in March 2003, British government representative 
Peter Hain first opposed the inclusion of the concept of the primacy of Community law in the 
draft constitutional treaty. His objections were later dropped following a series of arguments 
in favor of the draft17.   
However, this very example demonstrates how challenging it is to precisely identify 
the existence and the impact of deliberation. Did exchanging opinions truly modify Hain’s 
stated preference or was his eventual assent more prosaically the result of a realist evaluation 
of the power relationship? Negotiation and deliberation are mutually exclusive on a 
theoretical level only. In practice, these two approaches can complement each other. Clearly, 
the creation of a permanent chair of the European Council owes much to the will of the larger 
states, actively supported by Giscard d’Estaing.  But, the final compromise was facilitated by 
discussions within the Convention (during the January 2003 session and in preparatory 
meetings). This  prompted  smaller Member States to put forward arguments against it – 
notably the risk of having a new, powerful actor in the EU who would encroach on the 
powers of the President of the Commission18. Hence, the compromise over the idea of a 
“chairperson”, which could be accepted by both sides, as it could provide the Union with 
greater stability while limiting the risk of a clash with the Commission. 
                                                 
17 EP. Background information. Convention 05/03 : Discussion on the competences of the Union,  
http://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/index_en.htm, see ‘Debates at the Convention’, then ‘Summary of 
debates’. 
18 Intervention G. de Vries, 20 January, 2003, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/textes/verbatim_030120.htm 
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One should distinguish between deliberation and consensual ideas. Much of the 
Convention’s work was inspired by ideas shared by a large number of delegates. Some ideas 
met with little resistance, whether they involved issues to address (e.g. the democratic deficit, 
the complexity of the existing treaties) or solutions to envisage (e.g. the role of parliamentary 
assemblies in enhancing legitimacy).  Was this a case of successful deliberation?  This would 
assume that initially divergent positions became more closely aligned through discussion. 
Yet, on the topics mentioned above, consensus was easily reached and the debate played a 
more modest role, revealing and confirming the existence of initial convergent opinions upon 
which concrete reforms could be built.  
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the actual influence of deliberation on the 
Convention’s outcome, it seems clear that the “Convention method” altered the rules of the 
game. Whatever their true preferences were, participants in the discussion had to comply with 
a certain code of conduct. 
 President Giscard d’Estaing often reminded the Convention members that they were 
not to act as simple agents of their home government or institutions (Magnette, 2003). As 
Vice-President Giuliano Amato put it during the final plenary session, contrary to IGCs, in 
which governments were under no obligation to justify their position, the Convention method 
obligated each person to justify his or her point of view.19 True, in IGCs too, national 
governments’ representatives do argue, but they can put an end to the discussion quite easily 
by using their veto right. In the Convention, they were more constrained. Thus, when the 
French government representative threatened that France would refuse to ratify a document 
not respecting the ‘exception culturelle’, reactions from the floor were tumultuous20.  Many 
Convention members saw this veiled veto threat as contravening the code of conduct that 
ought to govern the assembly’s work. This prompted the French government to link its 
proposal to the protection of ‘cultural diversity’, already approved as one of the Union’s 
objectives, 21 making a compromise possible.22 This is consonant with the conclusions drawn 
by Jon Elster from his comparison of 18th century constitutional conventions: notwithstanding 
the ‘strategic use’ that is often made of argumentation, the exchange of arguments facilitates 
a gradual convergence (Elster, 1994; see also Magnette, 2003).  
 
The final result bears the mark of numerous “ideational” matrixes, even in areas in which 
governments vigilantly protected their interests.  The splitting of the Treaty in two parts – an 
institutional one and one devoted to policies23 was discussed even before the Amsterdam 
Treaty; indeed, the Commission had commissioned a series of feasibility studies.24 The idea 
of a “double-hatted” foreign minister, with one foot inside the Commission, had been floated 
by Romano Prodi in a speech before the European Parliament in October 2000 (Petite, 2005). 
The procedure for appointing the President of the Commission was also influenced by the 
strength of the parliamentary model in the political culture of European countries.  Although 
many governments – from large and small states alike – indicated they wanted to maintain 
                                                 
19See the verbatim report of the plenary session, 10 July 2003, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/textes/verbatim_030710.htm  
20 The verbatim report of the plenary session of 11 June 2003 indicates that Pascale Andréani’s intervention 
provoked ‘various reactions’... http://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/textes/verbatim_030611.htm.   
21 Article I-3 
22 Article III-315 stipulates that the Council shall act unanimously only when agreements ‘risk prejudicing the 
Union’s cultural and linguistic diversity’. 
23 Which became Part III after the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
24 See in particular the reports put forward by the European University Institute of Florence ‘’A fundamental 
treaty for the EU. Studies on treaty reorganisation’’ May 15,  2002, see also ‘’ Reforming treaty revision 
procedure. The second report on treaty reorganisation’’ July 31 2002. 
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control over this important appointment, the language used in the draft constitution implies 
strong parliamentary involvement, as the Parliament gained the right to ‘elect’ the president 
of the executive.  In practice, however, the Parliament will only be able to vote on the 
candidate “nominated” by the heads of state and government.  The actual impact of this new 
provision remains to be seen, it is not clear that it significantly alters the current system in 
which the influence of the European Council is decisive (Hix, 2001; Dehousse, 2004). 
Nevertheless, coating the President of the Commission in a parliamentary polish clearly 
demonstrates how important the parliamentary matrix was among members of the 
Convention.  
 
 
3. The Importance of Expertise 
 
 Earlier analyses have stressed the role of expertise in institutional reform processes, 
highlighting for instance, the part played by the Council Secretariat in recent IGCs 
(Christiansen, 2002) or by the Committee of Central Banks Governors in the Maastricht 
Treaty negotiations (Verdun, 2000; McNamara, 2001). As with many complex decisions, the 
role of experts was often considerable in the Convention. Their importance was enhanced by 
two sets of factors: the agenda was very broad and the tabula rasa option was excluded. The 
intention was to reform the existing, rather than create ex novo structures.  The Convention 
had to find its way through a maze of existing treaties – a result of previous, usually 
incomplete reforms that tended to increase the complexity of the European institutional 
system.  It also needed to consider the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the law.  Therefore, 
in certain cases, the most influential actor was neither a national government representative 
brandishing his right of veto, nor a Convention member offering convincing arguments, but 
rather an official with the necessary expertise to analyze a particular problem and propose a 
solution.  Unsurprisingly, the pertinent expertise was often of a legal nature: the Convention 
needed experts capable both of mastering the current state of legal affairs and of writing 
precise texts. 
 Thus, lawyers from the Commission, the Parliament and the Council were given the 
task of tidying up Part III dealing with EU policies, which was hardly discussed in the last 
session of the Convention (and on which the subsequent French referendum campaign largely 
focused) . The Secretariat of the Convention predominantly made up of lawyers, also 
weighed in on a number of key decisions. One of its members drafted large bits of the report 
of the working group on freedom, security and justice, as well as the first versions of the 
corresponding articles. The Convention’s general endorsement of the need for stronger 
European action in the area of Justice and Home Affairs facilitated the acceptance of 
provisions aiming to ‘communitarise’ the third pillar. In the same way, while there was broad 
support for increased ‘simplification’, an expertise in European law was necessary in order to 
put forward proposals and to understand their possible effects.  Some members of the 
Secretariat, under  the Vice-President Giuliano Amato, played an important role in this 
respect (Deloche-Gaudez, 2004). Amato, himself a law professor, chaired the two Working 
Groups on this issue (simplification and legal personality) and in plenary meetings, 
eloquently drew on concepts like separation of powers, hierarchy of norms and the procedural 
typologies currently used in constitutional law. His proposals were therefore difficult to 
challenge. 
 Most participants in the exercise seemed to be aware that expertise can be a strong 
political asset. On occasion, the experts tried to conserve their ‘comparative advantage’ over 
Convention members. The Secretariat created catalogs to better visualize the effects of 
simplifying procedures and instruments, but it was reluctant to transmit them to the 
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Convention because they allowed a clear view of both the extension of qualified majority 
voting/ co-decision procedure and the exceptions that remained25. The architects of the final 
compromise, eager to avoid head-on confrontation, often used their expert knowledge to 
diffuse potential conflicts.  They could, for instance, argue that opposing the elimination of 
the Maastricht Treaty “pillars” was pointless if the distinct procedures that characterized them 
– in particular, unanimous voting in foreign policy matters – remained (Amato, 2003).  
Similarly, making co-decision and majority voting the rule (Article 33, paragraph 1) was 
easier to accept due to the fact that significant exceptions remained. Such tactical tricks 
largely explains the trompe l’oeil elements present in the final text (Dehousse, 2004). This 
notwithstanding, there were limits to what experts could achieve: their role appears to have 
been most important in areas in which technical issues were at the fore and there was a broad 
consensus on the kind of changes that were required. In areas in which states had strong and 
contrasting preferences, they were less inclined to give them a free rein (Magnette and 
Nicolaïdis, 2004). 
  
 
III. The Influence of Institutional Factors 
 
 
Institutionalist theories have long argued that the rules of the game structure the 
power play and eventually the policy outcomes (Steinmo, 2004). The work of the Convention 
provides many illustrations thereof. We have already seen that the heterogeneity in the 
assembly’s membership and the shift to decision-making by consensus have occasionally 
allowed the development of a deliberative logic (see above section 2). The organizational 
powers conferred upon the President and the Presidium have largely contributed to shaping 
the discussion.  Similarly, the fact that the Convention’s work was to be reviewed by a 
subsequent IGC influenced the behavior of many actors. In other words, institutional factors 
clearly impinged upon the final result. 
 
1. The Weight of Organizational Power 
 
  In the work of any assembly, the ability to control the agenda, organize the work, 
chair debates and choose the elements appearing in the documents provided to members are 
crucial assets.  Used strategically, they enable actors in control to privilege certain 
orientations.  In contrast with the situation in intergovernmental conferences, which are 
largely unregulated exercises, and therefore more difficult for any one actor to control 
(Smith, 2002), in the Convention’s case, those powers were concentrated in the hands of a 
few people: the President, the members of the Presidium and the members of the Secretariat.  
 
 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s initiatives clearly exerted a strong influence over the 
debates. As early as the inaugural session, he suggested submitting a single proposal to the 
IGC instead of the options contemplated in the Laeken declaration. He later proposed that the 
final product take the form of a draft constitutional treaty, whose provisions were to be 
approved by the convention. The President often made use of his organizational power, 
sometimes in collusion with the Presidium, sometimes alone.  His decision to begin with a 
long ‘listening phase’ and his refusal to accept working groups on certain subjects clearly 
impinged on the debates. The conclusions he drew from the plenary sessions were contested 
time and again by Convention members, fearful of being instrumentalized. Not only did the 
                                                 
25 That document was later made public as an annex to document CONV 727/03. 
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organizing bodies structure the debates, but they were also able to filter what was proposed to 
the assembly26or indeed what was not proposed. For instance, on the key issue of how the 
Constitution would be modified in the future, some  members of the Convention had asked in 
plenary for a more flexible revision clause.27 A proposal to this effect was even tabled by the 
coordinators of the three main party groups, Giuliano Amato, Elmar Brok and Andrew Duff. 
Yet, given the governments’ opposition, the President and the Secretariat did not issue any 
concrete proposals, thus securing the status quo: unanimity was retained (Duhamel, 
2003:124-25). 
 The best illustration of the power enjoyed by the oligarchy piloting the work of the 
Convention is the way discussions on institutional reform were handled.  Whereas on other 
issues a fairly open procedure had been followed, with preliminary discussions in working 
groups, followed by a debate in plenary, the method chosen for the institutions  did differ.  
The president deferred the debates on this subject as long as possible and seemingly, with the 
agreement of the two Vice-Presidents, decided not to create working groups on institutional 
issues, thereby largely ‘confiscating’ the debate.  While the Secretariat wrote the first drafts 
for most texts, Giscard d’Estaing himself produced the draft articles on the institutions with 
the help of John Kerr and two ‘drafters’ from the secretariat (one French and one British). 
Unsurprisingly, given the nationality of their authors, those proposals were generally close to 
the views of larger Member States.28 The draft articles were leaked to the press even before 
any discussion in the Presidium. They were then subjected to a heated debate in that body 
where a number of modifications were introduced. From that moment, the Convention 
members had little time left to discuss them in plenary. A limited number of amendments 
were introduced to meet the concerns of smaller countries,29 but they were agreed upon within 
the Presidium.  
  
2. The Looming Shadow of the IGC 
 
As already mentioned, it had been decided in Laeken that the Convention was to be followed 
by an Intergovernmental Conference, in which states would regain their veto.  Therefore, 
Convention members had to be careful not to cross the lines drawn by the governments.  The 
looming shadow of the Intergovernmental Conference prompted more than one 
Conventioneer to alter his preferred solution in the name of realism. The bargaining in the 
final weeks was worthy of any Intergovernmental Conference. The key issue was no longer 
finding an hypothetical common good, but to work out concessions to satisfy particular 
governments, in the hopes of finally arriving at a compromise acceptable to all (Dauvergne, 
2004; Norman, 2003). 
This notwithstanding, even at the end of the Convention, the negotiation logic was not 
the only one at work. Despite their strong objections to the new system of qualified majority 
proposed by the Presidium, the Spanish and Polish governments were unable to prevent its 
inclusion in the draft Convention. At the very end of the Convention, the President of the 
Convention took advantage of his position to isolate the Spanish representative in the 
Presidium, Alfonso Dastis, by making concessions to other opponents in order to break the 
                                                 
26 Cite the relevant provisions in the rules of pcd 
27 See for instance Antonio Vitorino’s intervention in the verbatim report of the plenary session of  25 April  2003, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/textes/verbatim_030425.htm.  
28 Such as  the concept of a non-rotating president of the European Council, which in the interim gained the 
support of the larger states 
29 e.g. the idea of an “equal rotation” for commissioners or provisions limiting the role of the European Council 
President. 
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alliances built by Spain (Norman, 2003: 281) Thus, on a key issue, the threat of a veto by two 
large countries did not prevent the Convention from going ahead. 
 This was, of course, a risky choice given the Member States’ sensitivity on voting 
rights issues. Challenging some of them was, however, not irrational. The alleged virtue of 
the “Convention method” and the qualities conferred on its work by most European leaders 
meant that although every national government retained the right to veto the entire project, 
doing so would be a costly choice, particularly for those who were generally supportive of the 
Convention’s work. Governments therefore had to pick their fights in the second round, to an 
extent they may not have anticipated during the Convention. This may explain why some of 
them ended up accepting concessions that would have seemed unthinkable in a ‘normal’ IGC. 
Very few people, for instance, would have bet on French acceptance of a greater influence of 
the European parliament on agricultural expenses. Yet, this is what eventually happened 
(Jabko, 2004). In other words, if the prospect of the forthcoming IGC influenced the 
deliberations of the Convention, the reverse was also true: the choices made by the 
Convention did constrain the margin of maneuver of national governments in the IGC.   
   
3. Discussion Fora 
 
Finally, the fora within which the discussions took place effected the dynamic at 
work.  
A deliberative logic was more likely to emerge in a working group, with fewer actors 
who could speak freely, without time limits. This may in part explain why France was led to 
accept the elimination of the distinction between compulsory and non–compulsory spending, 
referred to earlier. During the discussions within a small ‘reflection circle’, the alternate 
representative of the French government, Pascale Andréani, came to realize that the French 
positions met with strong resistance from various corners. Given the history of parliamentary 
regimes in Europe, the democratic election of the EP and the consensus on the need for 
simplification within the Convention, how could one argue that a part of the EU budget 
should be kept in the hands of national governments? In such a setting, changes of 
preferences in light of exchanged arguments were not rare. 30 This tends to confirm lessons 
from the Philadelphia convention, where the possibility of holding informal debates seems to 
have facilitated the emergence of a consensus (Deloche-Gaudez, 2003b). Conversely, the fact 
that institutional issues were considered only at a late stage and without preparation in 
working groups did not allow the diffusion of tensions that had emerged between national 
governments. As a result, there was no real alternative to a classical negotiation scheme in 
which participants had to exchange concessions.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The institutional reform process triggered by the Laeken Declaration was essentially 
hybrid.  The previous sections have illustrated the complexity of the Convention process.  
Work in that new body was subject to multifarious, sometimes contrasting influences, which 
cannot be summed up in a single model.  To be sure, on the whole, national cleavages seem 
to have had more impact than ideological cleavages.  At the same time, both the reform 
process and its eventual outcome bear the mark of the ideas made by numerous European 
actors prior to and during the Convention. The  role played by experts, both in the national 
capitals and the Secretariat, appears equally significant. Negotiations, the hallmark of 
                                                 
30 See also the exchange between Swedish delegate G. Lennmarker  and Alexander Earl of Stockton on the 
‘right of withdrawal’ from the EU during the   Meeting on 3 April 2003, 
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Intergovernmental Conferences, have anything but disappeared, but they were constrained by 
the ‘strategic use of argumentation’. Notwithstanding the high hopes generated by the new 
‘Convention method’, other, less transparent factors, such as the weight of expertise or the 
control exercised by a few actors over the work of the assembly, also influenced the eventual 
outcome.  
   Trying to make sense of this complex reality, we have argued that institutional 
variables have had a decisive influence on the work of the Convention. Membership rules, 
which rendered the Convention much more heterogeneous than an intergovernmental 
conference; the possibility of holding informal discussions in working groups; or the fact that 
a more flexible decision-making rule was retained all concurred to make room for new, more 
deliberative dynamics. At the same time, the fact that an IGC followed pushed in the opposite 
direction and largely explains why, in areas where governments had strong preferences, the 
latter could not be ignored. Last but not least, the organizational powers of the President and 
the Presidium enabled them to exert a strong influence on the final outcome. Thus, assessing 
both the elements of novelty and the elements of stability introduced by what came to be 
known as “the Convention method”, one sees the mark of institutional choices made before 
or during the Convention. To be sure, these are elements that ought to be kept in mind if the 
experience is to be repeated. 
These elements largely explain the mixed outcome of the process. The draft 
constitution is by no means revolutionary. The Member States, and in particular their 
governments, remain the true masters of the “constitution”, even if they did not retain full 
control of debates on the Convention’s floor. This is obvious from the ratification and 
amendment clauses, which require their unanimous agreement.  The changes made to the 
institutional architecture, while significant, were only of an incremental nature. At the same 
time, however, some governments have accepted changes they opposed in the previous IGC, 
such as the definition and the scope of qualified majority voting or the legal status of the 
charter. 
 Moreover, history has taught us modesty when evaluating the results of institutional 
reforms.  The Single European Act, which is now assigned a critical role in the revival of 
European integration in the mid-1980s, was described by Mrs. Thatcher as a “modest step” 
and was subjected to fierce criticism by a number of scholars who deemed it too conservative 
(Pescatore, 1986?). In the same fashion, some elements in the draft constitution may 
unexpectedly cause new dynamics to emerge.  The sheer reference to a “constitution” has 
already given rise to debates that were much more open than in the past.  Several countries, 
including some in which this was not formally required, have already indicated they consider 
a referendum necessary prior to ratification.  Granting a legal status to the Charter on Human 
Rights might lead a whole series of actors to follow legal channels to help defend their 
interests.  The Court of Justice might find there a fertile ground judicial activism. In other 
words, chances are good that even if the governments have only partly loosened their control, 
the reform process may have unexpected consequences. 
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